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Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols are cryptographic techniques with security based only
on the laws of quantum mechanics. Two prominent QKD schemes are the BB84 and B92 protocols
that use four and two quantum states, respectively. In 2000, Phoenix et al. proposed a new family
of three state protocols that offers advantages over the previous schemes. Until now, an error rate
threshold for security of the symmetric trine spherical code QKD protocol has only been shown
for the trivial intercept/resend eavesdropping strategy. In this paper, we prove the unconditional
security of the trine spherical code QKD protocol, demonstrating its security up to a bit error rate
of 9.81%. We also discuss on how this proof applies to a version of the trine spherical code QKD
protocol where the error rate is evaluated from the number of inconclusive events.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols permit
two separated parties, say Alice and Bob, to construct a
secret shared string of bits that may be used for cryp-
tography. The first QKD protocol, called BB84, was
invented by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1]. It re-
quires Alice to randomly produce four different states
|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉 and send them through a quantum
channel to Bob who measures them randomly in the
{|0〉, |1〉} basis or in its conjugate basis {|+〉, |−〉}. The
unconditional security of this protocol was first shown
by Mayers in 1996 [2]. A simpler QKD protocol, B92,
was proposed by Bennett in 1992 [3]. It requires Al-
ice to produce only two non-orthogonal states, say |ψ1〉
and |ψ2〉, and Bob to perform the measurement de-
scribed by the POVM (positive operator-valued measure)
{α|ψ1〉〈ψ1|, α|ψ2〉〈ψ2|, 1 −α|ψ1〉〈ψ1|−α|ψ2〉〈ψ2|}, where
|ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are orthogonal to |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉, respec-
tively, and α equals 11+|〈ψ1|ψ2〉| to optimize the proba-
bility of a conclusive result to occur. Recent results by
Tamaki et al. showed that B92 is secure for small noise,
and the security threshold depends on qubit losses [4].
Phoenix et al. [5] postulated that the addition of a
third state to the B92 protocol could considerably en-
hance its security and would be optimal if the three quan-
tum states form an equilateral triangle on the X-Z plane
in the Bloch sphere. We call this particular case the
trine spherical code QKD protocol or the PBC00 proto-
col. PBC00 is similar to B92, except that Alice randomly
chooses two of three states for a basis instead of using two
fixed states. From Eve’s point of view, the state sent by
Alice is a maximally mixed state, unlike in B92. This
feature is similar to BB84, in which the choice of encod-
ing basis by Alice corresponds to a random rotation (the
identity or the Hadamard transformation). In PBC00,
the choice of encoding basis by Alice also corresponds to
a rotation—by 120 degrees, 240 degrees, or none at all.
Intuitively, we could expect to find a security threshold
for PBC00 that is independent of qubit losses and that
is close to the one of BB84. As we will explain in detail,
our security proof also applies to a slightly modified ver-
sion of the PBC00 protocol proposed by Renes [6] that
we will refer to as R04. In this protocol, the error rate
is estimated from the number of inconclusive events, and
all conclusive results can be used as data bits instead of
wasting some as test bits. This also simplifies the classi-
cal communication between Alice and Bob because they
do not need to randomly select a set of test bits and
broadcast them.
Up to now, the high error rate threshold for the secu-
rity of the PBC00 protocol has only been shown in the
special case of the intercept/resend attack [6]. In this
Letter, we will give a proof of the unconditional security
of the PBC00 and R04 protocols. Assuming one-way
classical communication, we show that these protocols
are secure up to a bit error rate of 9.81%. In order to es-
tablish security, we first propose a QKD scheme based on
an Entanglement Distillation Protocol (EDP) [7]. This
protocol uses a Calderbank, Shor, and Steane (CSS)
code [8], a technique first used by Shor and Preskill in
their security proof for BB84 [9]. Before running an EDP
based on CSS codes, Alice and Bob perform state rota-
tions followed by Bob’s local filtering operation (LF) [10].
The local filtering operation correlates the phase and bit
error rates, as in the security proof of B92 [4]. Thanks to
the state rotation by Alice and Bob, we achieve phase er-
ror estimation from bit error estimation. We will also ex-
plain how the security of R04 follows from that of PBC00.
The PBC00 protocol involves three states |ψ1〉 ≡
1
2 |0x〉 +
√
3
2 |1x〉, |ψ2〉 ≡ 12 |0x〉 −
√
3
2 |1x〉, and |ψ3〉 ≡|0x〉, where {|0x〉, |1x〉} is a basis state (X-basis) of a
qubit state. The Z-basis is defined by {|jz〉 ≡ [|0x〉 +
(−1)j|1x〉]/
√
2} (j = 0, 1), and we also define states
|ψ¯1〉 =
√
3
2 |0x〉 − 12 |1x〉, |ψ¯2〉 =
√
3
2 |0x〉 + 12 |1x〉 and
|ψ¯3〉 = |1x〉 that are orthogonal to |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, and |ψ3〉,
2respectively. The protocol proceeds as follows.
PBC00:
1.1 Alice creates a large trit string r and a large bit string
b of the same length. For each ri, the i
th trit value of the
trit string r, she chooses the set {|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉} (if ri = 0),
{|ψ2〉, |ψ3〉} (if ri = 1), and {|ψ3〉, |ψ1〉} (if ri = 2). If
the ith bit value bi is 0, she prepares the first state of the
chosen pair. If the bit is 1, she prepares the second state.
Alice sends all prepared qubits to Bob.
1.2 Bob performs a measurement described by the
POVM { 23 |ψ¯1〉〈ψ¯1|, 23 |ψ¯2〉〈ψ¯2|, 23 |ψ¯3〉〈ψ¯3|}. He publicly
announces when all his measurements are done, and Alice
in turn announces the trit string r.
1.3 Bob regards the ith measurement outcome |ψ¯1〉 (if
ri = 0), |ψ¯2〉 (if ri = 1), and |ψ¯3〉 (if ri = 2) as the bit
value 0. Similarly, he regards |ψ¯2〉 (if ri = 0), |ψ¯3〉 (if ri =
1), and |ψ¯1〉 (if ri = 2) as the bit value 1. All other events
are regarded as inconclusive. Bob announces whether his
measurement outcome is inconclusive or not. Alice and
Bob keep all data where Bob’s outcome is conclusive,
discarding the rest.
1.4 Alice randomly chooses half of the remaining events
as test bits in order to estimate the bit error rate on
the code bits, and announces her selection to Bob. They
compare the values of their test bits, aborting the proto-
col if the error rate is too high.
1.5 By public discussion, they run classical error correc-
tion and privacy amplification protocols to share a secure
secret key.
In order to prove the security of PBC00, we relate this
protocol to a secure QKD based on an EDP initiated
by state rotations and a LF, followed by error correction
using CSS codes [9]. The LF is designed so that it proba-
bilistically distills the maximally entangled state |Φ+〉 =
1√
2
(|0z〉|0z〉 + |1z〉|1z〉) if the filtering succeeds. Thus,
the successful local filtering operation can be written by
a Kraus operator F = |0x〉〈0x| + 1√3 |1x〉〈1x|. For later
convenience, we define |Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|0z〉|0z〉 − |1z〉|1z〉),
|Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|0z〉|1z〉±|1z〉|0z〉), and Ry(2bπ/3) as a 2bπ/3
rotation around the Y-axis in the Bloch sphere. The
following is the secure QKD based on an entanglement
distillation protocol that will be reduced to PBC00.
QKD based on EDP:
2.1 Alice creates many pairs of qubits in the state |φ〉 =
1√
2
(|0z〉A|ψ1〉B + |1z〉A|ψ2〉B), and randomly chooses a
large trit string r whose length equals the number of pre-
pared qubit pairs. She applies Ry(2riπ/3) on the second
qubit of every pair and sends them to Bob.
2.2 Upon receiving the ith signal state, Bob determines
whether the signal is in a qubit state or not which phys-
ically corresponds to detecting a photon or not. If it is,
he declares this publicly to Alice, who in turn declares
the trit value ri. Bob applies Ry(−2riπ/3) on that qubit
state followed by the filtering operation. In cases where
the filtering operation does not succeed or Bob receives
a state that is not a qubit state, he publicly tells Alice to
discard her corresponding qubits.
2.3 Alice randomly chooses half of the remaining states
as test bits and the other half as code bits, and announces
her selection to Bob. For the test bits, Alice and Bob each
measure their halves in the Z-basis. By public discussion,
they determine the number of bit errors. If the number of
errors in the test bits is too high, they abort the protocol.
2.4 By public discussion, Alice and Bob agree on an ap-
propriate CSS code and run the EDP based on the CSS
code to distill nearly perfect Bell states from the remain-
ing qubit pairs (code pairs).
2.5 Alice and Bob each measure the Bell pairs in the
Z-basis to obtain a shared secret key.
First, we reduce this EDP based protocol into the
PBC00 protocol. The reduction can be made in the man-
ner of Shor and Preskill [9]. Their reduction technique
implies that, in the context of QKD, the EDP based on
CSS codes requires Alice to only perform Z-basis mea-
surements immediately after she has prepared the state
|φ〉 and Bob to only perform Z-basis measurements im-
mediately after he has performed the filtering operation.
The Z-basis measurement, together with Alice’s rotation,
is equivalent to the situation where Alice randomly sends
|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, or |ψ3〉 to Bob. On Bob’s side, the rotation
followed by the filtering operation and Z-basis measure-
ment is described by the following POVM,
Ry(2riπ/3)F
†|0z〉〈0z|FRy(−2riπ/3),
Ry(2riπ/3)F
†|1z〉〈1z|FRy(−2riπ/3),
Ry(2riπ/3)(1 − F †F )Ry(−2riπ/3), (1)
which are equivalent as a set to the POVM
{ 23 |ψ¯1〉〈ψ¯1|, 23 |ψ¯2〉〈ψ¯2|, 23 |ψ¯3〉〈ψ¯3|}, regardless of the trit
value ri. Note that failing the filtering operation is equiv-
alent to Bob measuring |ψ¯j〉 when Alice encoded in the
{|ψj+1〉, |ψj+2〉} basis in the PBC00 protocol. This com-
pletes the reduction.
The equivalence of the two schemes allows us to use the
EDP-based protocol to prove the security of PBC00. Se-
curity follows by employing a result of Shor and Preskill.
They showed that if the estimations of bit and phase error
rates on the code pairs are bounded, except for a failure
probability that becomes exponentially small as N in-
creases, then Eve’s mutual information on the secret key
also becomes exponentially small as N increases. Here,
N is the number of impure qubit code pairs. Since a
large number of test bits yields an exponentially reliable
estimation of the bit error rate on the code pairs, we only
have to show how to estimate the phase error rate from
the bit error rate on the code pairs in our protocol. In
the case of BB84, it is trivial to deduce that the phase
error rate must equal the bit error rate since the proto-
col can be interpreted as Alice and Bob measuring all the
time in the bit basis, but half the time, the bit errors are
inverted with the phase errors. In the case of the three
3state protocol, the phase error rate is five quarters of the
bit error rare. However, the lack of symmetry caused by
the filtering operation makes this more difficult to prove.
To make the estimation of the phase error rate, we
appeal to Azuma’s inequality [11]. For a brief explana-
tion of this inequality, consider N random, but depen-
dent events. Let {p(l)}l=1,..N be the set of probabilities
of having a head in coin flipping for each event. Note
that p(l) may depend on the results of the l− 1 previous
events. Azuma’s inequality tells us that if we perform
all the N coin flips and if have nhead head events, then
the probability that the difference between nhead/N and
1
N
∑N
l=1 p
(l) is larger than some arbitrary small quantity
drops exponentially as N increases.
Proof of our claim:
Definition: Suppose we have a series of events
F0, F1, .... Let X0, X1, ... be random variables. The se-
quence is a martingale iff the expectation of Xi+1 condi-
tional to events Fi, Fi−1, ...F0 is equal to Xi for all i.
Consider the case of N coin tosses, where the proba-
bility of getting heads for each coin may be correlated in
any way. Consider a series of events F0, F1, .... Let hi
be the number of heads from the events Fi, Fi−1, ...F0.
Let Xi be hi −
∑i
j=1 p
(j) where p(j) is the probability
of obtaining a head on the jth coin conditional on events
Fj−1, Fj−2, ...F0. The expectation of Xi+1 conditional on
events Fi, Fi−1, ...F0 is hi −
∑i
j=1 p
(j) plus the expecta-
tion of obtaining a head on the i + 1 coin, minus p(i+1).
Since the expectation of obtaining a head on the i + 1
coin minus p(i+1) is zero, the sequence X0, X1, ... is a
martingale.
Special Case of Azuma’s Inequality: Let X0, X1, ... be a
martingale sequence such that for each k, |Xk−Xk−1| ≤
1. Then, for all N ≥ 0 and any λ ≥ 0,
Pr[|XN −X0] ≥ λ| ≤ 2e− λ
2
2N .
In the case of coin flipping introduced above, the con-
dition |Xk − Xk−1| ≤ 1 is obviously satisfied. If we let
λ = Nǫ, then Azuma’s inequality implies that
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣hN −
∑N
j=1 p
(j)
N
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
]
≤ 2e−Nǫ
2
2 ,
which proves our claim that the probability that the av-
erage number of heads differs from
∑N−1
j=1 p
(j)
N
by more
than an arbitrarily small quantity, ǫ, drops exponentially
as N increases.

For the phase error estimations, we define {p(l)bit}l=1,..N
and {p(l)phase}l=1,..N as the sets of probabilities that Al-
ice and Bob detect a bit error and a phase error re-
spectively on the lth qubit pair after they have done the
same measurements on the l − 1 previous pairs. Let ebit
and ephase be, respectively, the bit and phase error rates
that Alice and Bob would have obtained if they had per-
formed bit and phase error measurements on the code
pairs. Azuma’s inequality tells us that if Cp
(l)
bit = p
(l)
phase
is satisfied for all l and a particular value of C, then we
have the exponentially reliable equality Cebit = ephase.
Since ebit gets exponentially closer to the bit error rate
on the test bits, eerr, we only need to find a value for C.
Before we try to obtain C, we must assume that Eve
can do any coherent attack on all the qubits sent by
Alice and that she can use all the ancillary qubits she
wants. We will write a general equation for the state of
the lth test pair depending on Eve’s action. We must
be careful to take into account that Alice and Bob’s
measurement outcomes on the previous l − 1 test pairs
might affect the measurement outcome for lth test pair.
Every qubit pair that has passed the filtering opera-
tion has undergone Alice’s rotation, Eve’s global oper-
ation and Bob’s rotation followed by the filtering oper-
ations. The reduced density operator of the lth qubit
can be written as ρ(l) = 13
∑
b=0,1,2 |φ(l)b 〉〈φ(l)b |, where
|φ(l)b 〉 = 1A ⊗
[
FRy(−2bπ/3)Eˆ(l)Ry(2bπ/3)
]
B
|φ〉, |φ〉 is
the state created by Alice in step 2.1 before she applies
a rotation, and Eˆ(l) represents Eve’s action restricted to
the lth test pair. For simplicity, we will suppose that
Eve’s action can be written in the form of a single ma-
trix Eˆ(l) that needs not to be unitary. As it will soon be
obvious, our final result still holds in the most general
case, where Eve’s action on the lth pair is represented by
a superoperator satisfying
∑
i Eˆ
(l)†
i Eˆ
(l)
i ≤ 1 . Note that
Eˆ(l) may depend on Eve or Alice and Bob’s measurement
outcome obtained from the previous l−1 test pairs. Also
note that we summed over the different values of b, since
r was selected randomly and independently of the other
operations done by Alice, Eve, or Bob.
The probability of measuring a bit error on the lth
test pair is p
(l)
bit =
1
ζ(l)
(〈Ψ+|ρ(l)|Ψ+〉 + 〈Ψ−|ρ(l)|Ψ−〉)
and the probability of measuring a phase error is
p
(l)
phase =
1
ζ(l)
(〈Φ−|ρ(l)|Φ−〉 + 〈Ψ−|ρ(l)|Ψ−〉), where
ζ(l) = (〈Φ+|ρ(l)|Φ+〉 + 〈Φ−|ρ(l)|Φ−〉) + (〈Ψ+|ρ(l)|Ψ+〉 +
〈Ψ−|ρ(l)|Ψ−〉) is the probability that the filtering opera-
tion succeeds on that qubit. Let us suppose that c11, c12,
c12 and c22 are the elements of Eˆ
(l) in the X basis where
the cij ’s are any complex numbers. Then, we easily ob-
tain that 54p
(l)
bit = p
(l)
phase. Thus, we have C =
5
4 , and by
the previous argument, we conclude that the phase error
rate on the code pairs, ephase, asymptotically approaches
5
4ebit. This imply that from the measured bit error rate
on the test pairs (eerr), Alice and Bob can not only get an
estimate of the bit error rate on the code pairs (ebit), but
can also deduce the phase error rate on them (ephase). If
Eve’s action is represented by a general superoperator,
then the above result still holds by linearity. Note that
this argument is valid for any eavesdropping allowed by
quantum mechanics because we allow {p(l)bit}l=1,..N and
{p(l)bit}l=1,..N to be arbitrary, including any correlations,
and because the Eˆ(l)’s are also arbitrary. Thus, our es-
timation is applicable to any attack, including coherent
4attacks.
Since we have the bit and phase error rates, we can cal-
culate the secret key rate. The asymptotically achievable
key generation rate for bit error rate ebit and phase er-
ror rate ephase is given by pconc [1− h(ebit)− h(ephase)],
where h(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the bi-
nary entropy [8], and pconc is the probability of conclusive
events. In our case, the key generation rate is given by
pconc
[
1− h(eerr)− h(54eerr)
]
. From this we find that the
PBC00 protocol is secure up to eerr ≈ 9.81%, for which
the key generation rate reaches 0. Contrary to the phase
error estimation of B92 over lossy and noisy channel [4],
this threshold is independent of the qubit losses because,
in the previous analysis, we considered only the qubits
that survived the filtering operation.
In order to compare the security performance of the
three-state protocol with the one of B92, BB84 and the
six-state protocol (which is similar the BB84 except that
Alice and Bob encode and measure in the X, the Z
and also the Y basis), we assume that Eve simulates
a depolarizing channel where a qubit state ρ evolves as
(1 − p)ρ + p3
∑
a=x,y,z σaρσa. Here, σa is the Pauli op-
erator for a component. It is known that B92, BB84
and the six-state protocol are secure up to p ≈ 3.4% [4],
p ≈ 16.5% [9] and p ≈ 19.1% [12], respectively, while the
three-state protocol is secure up to p ≈ 15.2%.
The above security proof also applies to the R04 proto-
col [6]. It is similar to the PBC00 protocol, except that
the rate of inconclusive events is used to estimate the
bit error rate in conclusive events, instead of using test
bits in step 1.5. In the following, we explain how that
is possible. As a first step, we will make a clear distinc-
tion between inconclusive results caused by qubit losses
and those caused by qubits that have failed the filter-
ing operation. From now on, inconclusive events exclude
the qubits lost in the channel. In PBC00, Alice ran-
domly chooses which basis she uses before sending the
state. Without threatening the security, we can mod-
ify the protocol so that she sends a random state |ψj〉
and waits until Bob has received it before choosing a ba-
sis. For each state, Alice can randomly pick between two
bases. The one that she chooses determines which result
from Bob’s POVM is inconclusive and which one will in-
duce a “good” conclusive result (by good, we mean not an
error). For Eve, there is no way to differentiate between
the one that is inconclusive and the one that induces
a “good” conclusive result. This implies that the num-
ber of “good” conclusive results approximately equals the
number of inconclusive results. Define I as the fraction of
inconclusive results left after discarding the lost qubits.
Then, (1 − ebit)(1 − I) is close to I, where ebit repre-
sent the error rate on all the conclusive events. More
precisely, the probability that ebit and
1−2I
1−I are different
by more than an arbitrary quantity goes exponentially
small as the number of received qubits increases. Conse-
quently, Alice and Bob can measure the error rate of the
conclusive results by counting the number of inconclu-
sive results. Note that the fraction of conclusive results
is pconc =
1
2−ebit >
1
2 .
In this Letter, we have proven the unconditional secu-
rity of the PBC00 and R04 protocols, the latter offering
the ability to estimate the bit error rate without sacrific-
ing test bits. Using one-way classical communication, we
found an error rate threshold of 9.81%. As in the case
of BB84, two-way classical communication could increase
the threshold [13]. We believe that Azuma’s inequality,
used in our security proof, might be useful in other QKD
protocol security proofs. Finally, we note that the secu-
rity proof in this Letter could likely be modified to show
the unconditional security of the tetrahedron spherical
code recently proposed by Renes [6] or of a new three
state QKD protocol robust against collective noise [14].
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